Conference keys are secret keys used by a group of users commonly with which they can encipher (or decipher) 
Introduction
In the age of computers and communications people in different places far away from each other can have a secure conference just by sitting in the front of their own computers via the Internet. A common key, called a conference key, is used to encrypt and decrypt messages which communicate among members participating in the conference. Before a conference is to be held, a conference key has to be generated and distributed safely to members in the conference. The main problem is how this conference key is packed and distributed in such a way that only the legitimate (invited) members can disclose it.
In this paper, we propose a conference key distribution system suitable for broadcast channel. A broadcast channel is characterized that a single transmission from a source user may be received simultaneously by many destination users. The concept of locking, called a sealed lock [15] , is used to lock a secret conference key, from which only legitimate users can open it. There is no constraint on the structure of user stations in our system. Moreover, the proposed system has the following properties. First, for a subgroup of users, only one common secret key is required. Second, the conference key can be changed randomly without changing a ciphering key of any user.
The proposed scheme is based on Diffie and Hellman's PKDS [5] . The construction of a sealed lock is straightforward and the revelation of a conference key is simple. In Section 2, we present a brief review of a conference key distribution scheme. Section 3 will describe the overview of our approach and give an example. In Section 4, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme. According to our analysis, the conference key distribution scheme is presented in Section 5. Finally, we have a conclusion.
Conference Key Distribution
Diffie and Hellman proposed a public key distribution system (PKDS) based on the one-way function F(X)=Z X mod p, where p is a large prime number and Z is a primitive element in Galois field GF(p). Here a one-way function means that there exists a fast algorithm for computing F(X) from any given X; however, the computation of X from F(X) is infeasible within a reasonable time limitation [4] . Their PKDS works as follows. Users A and B choose randomly the integers X a and X b , respectively, from numbers in the range [ 
This enables users A and B to communicate using encrypted messages by applying any cryptosystem with the key K ab .
We can see that it is very straightforward to compute the common key K ab . Each user needs at most log 2 p multiplications over GF(p). On the contrary, if user A (or user B) intends to expose the private key X b (or X a ) of his partner, he has to compute discrete logarithms. From the result of Pohlig and Hellman [17] , computing discrete logarithms over GF(p) is considered to be a rather difficult problem if p-1 has at least one large prime factor. Therefore, Eq(2.1) is a one-way function on which the PKDS based.
However, PKDS can serve only for two users to have a session key. If three or more users want to have a conference in common, a conference key is needed, each pair of the users have to keep one secret key. Therefore, in order to communicate with each other among any subgroup of users in the system, we need to derive a common secret key. In addition, for communicating a message to several users, the sender has to perform different encryptions and transmit the ciphertexts several times separately. Clearly, it is very inefficient to use this approach for a conference.
To overcome the above problems, Ingemarsson, Tang, and Wong [8] proposed an elegant scheme named conference key distribution system (CKDS) for any subgroup of m users to share the same encryption and decryption keys in a network with n users, where 2 ≤ m ≤ n. Conditionally, these m participants users have to be connected in a ring structure first before the progress of work follows. Within the ring structure, each user has to process and transmit the message received from his previous user station. Under this sequential order of message processing m-1 times, and finally the common conference key can be derived. However, an attacker may intercept the message transmitted along the ring. By putting the intercepted message together, a threat of wiretapping to the keys thus exists.
Generally, the CKDS can be classified into two categories: one is the non-ID-based type [3, 8, 13, 16, 19] and the other is the ID-based type [2, 14, 11, 12] . Unfortunately, most of the published ID-based CKDS are shown to be insecure [11, 12, 18, 20] . Therefore, in this paper, we focus our attention on the non-ID-based CKDS. In the following, we are going to review a practical non-ID-based CKDS [16] .
In 1988, Lu, et al. [16] proposed a conference key distribution system based on the Lagrange interpolating polynomial. Let us briefly describe their method as follows. As indicated in Diffie and Hellman's PKDS, each user possesses a private key X i and makes the key Y i public. Now we assume that there are r users, namely U 1 , U 2 , …, and U r , being invited to the conference by the chairman U 0 . First, a conference key α is chosen by U 0 and 2r numbers are computed, which are {K 01 , K 02 , …, K 0r } and {k' 01 , K' 02 ,
Secondly, U 0 construct a Lagrange interpolating polynomial L(x) as follows.
In other words, L(x) is a polynomial with degree r-1 passing the r points (K 0i , αK ' 0i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ r. Then L(x) is transmitted to users participating in the conference. Now the conference key α is hidden in L(x). Here we also like to point out that from Diffie and Hellman's formula, Eq(2.2), we have K 0i =(Y i ) X0 mod p=(Y 0 ) Xi mod p. Therefore, on receiving L(x), an invited user U i can evaluate the polynomial L(K 0i ) and would obtain the value αK ' 0i ; i.e., he obtain L(K 0i )= αK ' 0i . Furthermore, he can obtain the conference key by the following.
Where (K ' 0i ) -1 indicates the multiplication inverse of (K ' 0i ) with modulus p. However, each time when a conference is to be held, a Lagrange interpolating polynomial has to be constructed. Moreover, every invited user must evaluate L(x) to obtain conference key α.
In the next section, we present a new conference key distribution scheme. By using our scheme, interpolating polynomials are constructed just once and for all.
Background of Our Scheme
Imagine that there is a group G containing n+1 users, denoted by U 0 , U 1 , U 2 ,…, and U n , in a networking system. Let G' indicate a nonempty subgroup of m users within G, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n.
Suppose that, initially, each user U i keeps secret a private key X i , chosen randomly by U i from numbers in the range [1, p-1] , where p is a large prime number, and publishes the associated public key Y i =(Z)
Xi mod p, where Z is a primitive element in the GF(p), where GF(p) indicates the Galois field over p. Without loss of generality, assume that U 0 is the chairman and U 1 , U 2 , …,U r are users invited to the conference; i.e., G ' ={U 1 , U 2 , …,U r }. In order to hold a secure conference among the users in G ' , a secret conference key, denoted by α, has to be created by the chairman for the conference. Note that α is also chosen in GF(p).
We can see that if there is a secure method which can conceal the conference key α then the corns of the conference key distribution system can be solved. Since the conference key is enciphered, only one copy is needed to be sent in a broadcast system. Further, since the conference key is generated when a conference is going to be held, no extra key has to be kept in secret. Based upon these ideas, a new approach is proposed. A lock, called the sealed lock, is created and applied to lock the conference key. Note that the concept of a sealed lock for conference key distribution was proposed by Lin, et al. [15] . The sealed lock only matches the private keys of users in G ' . Accordingly, we may assume that the conference key is hidden in the sealed lock and the lock satisfies two requirements. First, since only users in G ' are invited, the lock should be opened only by the users in G ' , not any user in G-G ' . Second, the lock should be variant according to different conference key α. That is, each time we use different lock depending on different conference key. Briefly, a sealed lock has to rest functionally on not only the conference key α but also the ciphering keys of the users. Now, the remaining problem is how we can construct the sealed lock. Before presenting the method, let us describe the informal steps of the scheme. First, U 0 chooses a n×n nonsingular matrix over GF(p). Let the row vectors of K be K 1 From the above statements, it is not difficult to see that if the chosen row vector K i could be possessed by user U i and the vector B were made public, then each user U i would be able to compute the value c i by himself (or herself). Thus, the invited users would obtain c i =α, the conference key; and the uninvited users would obtain c i = 0. However, how can we distribute K i to user U i securely? In the following, we give a method to conceal the matrix K in such a way that only user U i can reveal the corresponding i th row vector K i .
First, for each column of the matrix K, namely column j, we construct an interpolating polynomial F j [1, 9, 10] with degree n-1 passing through the n points (ID i , (k ij ) P mod Q), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Here ID i indicates the identification number of user U i and Q=q 1 ×q 2 is the product of two large prime numbers. Note that as aforementioned we assume that user U 0 is the chairman and only users U 1 , U 2 ,…, and U r are invited to the conference. Moreover, for each column of the matrix K, e.g. the j th column, we construct another interpolating polynomial, namely H j , with degree n-1 passing through the n points
The construction steps of an interpolating polynomial, one can consult [1, 9, 10] . Therefore, we obtain a set of 2n polynomials, namely F = {F 1 , F 2 , …, F n , H 1 , H 2 , …, H n }. Finally, the set F of polynomials are made public by the chairman to all the users in the system. Now, when the user U s , with identification ID s , reads the set F of polynomials, he (or she) can evaluate the values of polynomials F i (ID s ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We can see that the result will be as indicated below: 
, where b<n. Then b r mod n can be easily computed if gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = r. Proof. Since gcd(e 1 , e 2 ) = r, from Euclidean algorithm we can find a pair of (s 1 , s 2 ) such that s 1 e 1 +s 2 e 2 = r. Therefore, we have It is easy to see that the sealed lock, the vector B, satisfies the previous two requirements. Here we would like to point out that to open the sealed lock in the conference key distribution system, one's private key, not any extra key, is needed. Moreover, the conference key can be changed in a convenient way within the conference. When a suspected attack is found, the chairman may change the conference key as he wishes. . Let X 0 =8, X 1 =6, X 2 =9, X 3 =4, Y 0 =3, Y 1 =9, Y 2 =6, and Y 3 =5. We also let ID 1 =1, ID 2 =2, and ID 3 =3. Without loss of generality, assume that U 0 is the chairman and U 1 and U 2 are users being invited to the conference; i.e., G'={U 1 , U 2 }. In order to hold a secret conference key α=7 among the users in G', the chairman executes the following steps: (2, 1, 6 ). 
Security Consideration
In this section, we shall discuss the security of the proposed scheme.
In the following, attacks to conference key and the personal private keys, are considered to demonstrate the security of the system. First, an intruder, namely U j , not in G', may try to find the conference key α. Since U j is not in G', he will find c j =0. Not any information from the lock he can get about the conference key. Secondly, the intruder may be a member in G' itself. After knowing the conference key α, he tries to obtain a private key X s of some other user U s in G'. With this private key X s , he can decrypt the messages for U s from another conference in which he does not participate. Form Eq(3.2) and Eq(3.4), we know that the intruder can compute 2n pairs of numbers F i (ID S ) and H i (ID S ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By knowing these 2n pairs, to solve each k si by the Theorem 3.1, the value of (Y 0 )
Xs mod p has to be known in advance. On the other hand, if the value of (Y 0 )
Xs mod p is known, it has still to face the discrete logarithm problem to get X s . However, computing discrete logarithm has been seen as a difficult problem as aforementioned.
It will be not difficult to see that the chairman only has to publish the set F of interpolating polynomials to all the users just once and for all. On the other hand, a legitimate user can obtain the row vector corresponding to him by using his ID number and his private key. Further the conference key can thus be computed easily. Moreover, when different subgroup of users in group G are invited to hold a different conference, all what the chairman has to do is compute a new vector B and publish it. With this new vector B and the previously published set F, a new conference for another subgroup of users can be started. Besides, if unfortunately the conference key α is suspected to be under attack. The chairman can compute a new conference key α' just by replacing the old vector B with a new vector B' within the same conference without any modification to the set F. Nevertheless, one disadvantage is that the original matrix K -1 has to be kept secretly by the chairman. For security consideration, we suggest that matrix K -1 would be discarded after being transformed to the following two matrices.
for some integer s 1 , s 2 , …, s n in GF(p). When needed, the chairman can reconstruct the original matrix K from K and K in the same way.
Unfortunately, this system is vulnerable to the following two attacks. First attack works as follows. Assume that it is not difficult to find out whether user U i participated in a conference or not. If user U i is not a legal participant in the conference j, the intruder can store B j sent by the chairman and know that the corresponding c j is 0. He continues to store such B's until he obtains a subset } B ..., , B , {B . Because the system uses the same matrix K, the intruder can recover row K i by solving the equation
To eliminate these attacks, we have the detail of our proposed system in the next section.
Secure Conference Key Distribution
Let each user U i have a private key X i and a public key Y i as indicated in Diffie and Hellman's PKDS. Now, if a nonempty subgroup G' of users, with some user U 0 as the chairman, will hold a conference securely. We assume that a n×n nonsingular matrix K over GF(p) has been generated by chairman. First, the user U 0 selects a secret conference key α which will be used to encrypt and decrypt message among users in G'. To avoid two attacks mentioned in Section 4, let C be (c 1 . Then the user U 0 computes a vector B by solving Eq(3.1) as mentioned previously and makes it public to all the users in the system. Further, U 0 computes and publishes a set of 2n interpolating polynomials F={F 1 , F 2 , …, F n , H 1 , H 2 , …, H n } in which the matrix K is concealed. On the other hand, on receiving of F, the user U s should be able to compute 2n pairs of numbers F i (ID s ) and H i (ID s ),
. If the users U s is in G', an invited user, then by applying Theorem 3.1 he (or she) is capable of obtaining the row vector K s corresponding him (or her). Therefore, by K s and B, U s can compute the conference key by
Otherwise, when the user U s is not in G', he can only
In the following, let us state formally the algorithm for the conference key distribution scheme. Distribute B to all the users in the system. Note that as indicated in the above algorithm, the vector B is used as sealed lock in which the conference key α is hidden. Now for any user U i in G′ , he can reveal the conference key from the set F and the vector B by using his own private key X i . The revealing procedure is described as follows. After all the users in G' obtain the common secret key α, one can communicate with the others as he wishes. Messages are encrypted and decrypted by using the key α and a conference will proceed securely among the users. The key α may be generated at the beginning of the conference by the chairman and discarded when the conference is closed or it may be changed randomly within the period of time of this conference. From the above algorithm, in order to compute α, a user U s in G' only has to reveal the vector K s by using his own private key X s . Therefore, for conferences among users in any nonempty subgroup of G, the private keys needed to be kept by each user in the system are still the same.
Conclusions
It can be foreseen that teleconferencing will play a more and more important role in the age of computers and communications. However, the key issue is how we can design a convenient and secure way for conferencing by using our computers and communication networks. In this paper, we have proposed a method to computer a sealed lock by communicating the encrypted messages among users in the computer networks. By using the sealed lock, secure distribution of a conference key to all the station nodes is feasible in the network systems.
